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This Essay argues that the future of the majority-minority 
district is in peril, as a conservative majority on the Court stands 
poised to strike down section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. When the 
Court takes up the constitutionality of Section 2, binding precedent 
will play a secondary role at best. Instead, the Justices’ policy goals 
and ideological preferences—namely, their personal disdain for the 
use of race in public life—will guide the Court’s conclusion. In this 
vein, Justice Kennedy holds the fate of the Act in his hands. To be 
clear, this Essay is not trying to prognosticate the future of the Act. 
Instead, it is far more intrigued by the many lessons that the fate of 
the Act offers about the Court as an institution; the Court’s treatment 
of colored communities and their interests; and the role political 
attitudes play in guiding judicial behavior. As the Court continues to 
position itself at the center of many political controversies, these 
lessons gain greater urgency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The majority-minority district is now an important feature of the 
landscape of American Democracy. Thanks to these districts, 
candidates of color have joined legislative chambers in record 
numbers despite the existence of racially polarized elections and the 
refusal of voters to cross racial lines. Put differently, “race-conscious 
redistricting and the creation of effective minority districts remain the 
basis upon which most African American and Latino officials gain 
election.”1 
In the hands of the Roberts Court, however, these districts might 
soon become quaint relics of an old and racist past. The arguments 
against these districts are familiar. To Justice Kennedy, for example, 
the creation of these districts hinged on “offensive and demeaning 
assumption[s]” about minority voters that led to noxious racial 
stereotyping.2 Justice Thomas complained that these districts 
“exacerbate racial tensions.”3 Justice Scalia agreed that the 
jurisprudence in this area “continues to drift ever further from the 
[Voting Right] Act’s purpose of ensuring minority voters equal 
electoral opportunities.”4 Chief Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined 
by Justice Alito, famously declared that majority-minority districting 
is all a “sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”5 
These criticisms underscore the tenuous future of the majority-
minority district at the hands of a conservative Court. This is true both 
as a legal and a constitutional matter. The legal question is stated 
simply but is deceptively complex: Will the Supreme Court continue 
to interpret section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA” or “Act”) to 
 
 1. David Lublin et al., Has the Voting Rights Act Outlived its Usefulness? In a Word, “No,” 
34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 525, 547 (2009). 
 2. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1995). 
 3. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 4. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 512 (2006) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 5. Id. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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allow for the creation of majority-minority districts, or will changed 
realities lead to a narrower interpretation of the law?6 The evidence 
on this point is decidedly mixed. Recent cases suggest that the Court 
is no longer inclined to read the statute in broad and dynamic ways,7 
yet the early opinions, namely Thornburg v. Gingles,8 remain 
controlling law. 
The constitutional question is similarly complex yet far more 
intriguing. Five Justices have strong reservations about the 
constitutionality not only of section 2 of the Act but also of its special 
provisions as well. To date, however, the Supreme Court has left open 
the question whether section 2 is a constitutional exercise of 
congressional power.9 Not once has the Court subjected section 2 to 
rigorous judicial review, even in the face of very strong constitutional 
arguments. In the words of then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court’s 
posture “is nothing less than a total abdication of that authority, 
rather than an exercise of the deference due to a coordinate branch of 
the government.”10 This judicial posture is curious at best and 
demands an explanation. This Essay argues that the Act is on a 
collision course with the Court’s conservative majority and its views 
on the legitimate use of race and the proper scope of congressional 
power. Whether the Court ultimately strikes down the Voting Rights 
Act, or section 2 in particular, is a question only Justice Kennedy can 
answer. Of greater import are the many lessons that this question 
teaches us about the Court as an institution, the use of race by state 
actors, and the role political attitudes play in guiding judicial behavior. 
This Essay examines these lessons in five Parts. 
Part I frames the evolution of section 2 from its modest 
beginnings in 1965 to the complex constitutional question it is today. 
As part of this inquiry, this Part analyzes one of the most important 
cases in the history of the Act—City of Rome v. United States. 
 
 6. See generally Note, The Future of Majority Minority Districts in Light of Declining 
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208 (2003) (exploring the ramifications of a 
move towards coalitional districts and away from majority-minority districts). 
 7. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 8. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 9. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 992 (1996) (“We should allow States to assume the 
constitutionality of § 2 of the VRA, including the 1982 amendments.”); Johnson v. De Grandy, 
512 U.S. 997, 1028–29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is 
important to emphasize that the precedents to which I refer, like today's decision, only construe 
the statute, and do not purport to assess its constitutional implications.”). 
 10. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Part II moves the story ahead to 1997 and City of Boerne v. 
Flores.11 This Part takes seriously the idea that the Court grounds its 
decisions in law, not policy or the Justices’ personal preferences, yet 
ultimately argues that the legal model will have little to say about the 
resolution of section 2’s constitutional question. Instead, Part III 
argues that the Justices’ ideologies will play a much larger role in 
determining the constitutionality of section 2. But ideology will not be 
the Justices only consideration. The Justices are strategic actors; thus 
resolution of this important question will hinge not only on their 
political attitudes but also on the existing political context. 
Part IV examines the constitutionality of section 2 of the Act as an 
exercise in strategic judicial policymaking. This Part explains that the 
Court is best understood as a national policymaking institution that 
generally tracks existing public opinion. This understanding of the 
Court makes sense of the Court’s early deferential posture to the 
constitutionality of the Act, a statute that was supported by strong 
national majorities in Congress and the nation at large. This Part also 
agrees with the view that the Court sides with the interests of racial 
minorities only when these interests converge with majoritarian 
interests. This argument also makes sense of the Court’s handling of 
the Act. When originally understood as a law that opened the political 
process to all, the Act received wide support. In recent years, however, 
section 2 in particular has come to be viewed as an all-purpose anti-
discrimination statute, no different than those affirmative action plans 
for which conservatives on the Court have very little patience. Going 
forward, the constitutionality of section 2 will hinge on whether 
Justice Kennedy concludes that the provision is now far removed 
from its original purposes. Of note, this will be a question of raw 
attitudes, of perceptions about the world, and not a question of law. 
Finally, Part V considers the lessons of the Court’s handling of the 
constitutionality of the Act to our understanding of the Supreme 
Court as an institution. 
I. THE SETTING: SECTION 2 AS A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 came about 
uneventfully, maybe even as an afterthought. Its original language was 
oddly familiar: “No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
 
 11. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any 
State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”12 On 
its face, it is clear that section 2 was only codifying the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and both the Attorney General and leading members of 
Congress said as much during the hearings in 1965.13 This explains why 
there was little debate on this issue. For all the things that critics of 
the voting rights bill found objectionable, a codification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment was not among them. 
This was the reason why section 2 lay dormant for many years, 
even in the midst of the Court’s “reapportionment revolution.” Not 
only did section 2 add nothing of consequence to the Fifteenth 
Amendment, but the Fourteenth Amendment offered the Court all 
the power it needed to develop its nascent voting rights jurisprudence. 
The promise of equality was really that powerful. The litigation 
concerning equal representation took two separate routes. 
The Court first examined the question of vote dilution as a 
malapportionment question grounded in a strict conception of 
population equality within districts. As the Court explained in 
Reynolds v. Sims, “the right of suffrage can be denied by a 
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as 
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the 
franchise.”14 Dilution cases thus forced the Court to struggle with a 
general definition of “fair representation.” Perhaps too simplistically, 
the Court ultimately settled on a definition of fairness better known 
as “one person, one vote,”15 a definition that Justice Stewart chided as 
an “uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed application of sixth-grade 
arithmetic.”16 The lesson of these cases was clear: the Court’s nascent 
equality doctrine would go as far as the Court’s willingness to take on 
political problems would take it. This was a question of judicial will, 
plain and simple, a quest for fairness in elections for which legal 
arguments played a secondary role at best.17 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(a) (West 2010). 
 13. See, e.g., Voting Rights: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1564, 89th 
Cong. 171 (1965) (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (arguing that section 2 “is a restatement, in effect, 
of the 15th Amendment”). 
 14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 15. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
 16. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
 17. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards, 
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The second route followed directly from the first, yet proved far 
more complex and elusive. This thread of equality litigation focused 
on the question of minority vote dilution. If the right to vote could be 
denied when the state diluted the weight of a vote, it must also be the 
case that dilution would exist when the votes of black voters were 
rendered useless through the implementation of multimember 
districts. After all, to submerge black voters within a larger 
jurisdiction where they would never be able to win or even influence 
elections was akin to denying them the right to vote. The Court 
conceded as much the year after Reynolds in Fortson v. Dorsey: “It 
might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member 
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a 
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting 
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.”18 But 
to recognize the problem was not the same as offering a simple and 
manageable solution, in the mold of the “one person, one vote” 
principle. The constitutional test was understood differently by courts 
and commentators—from an intent test, to an effects test, to a totality 
of circumstances approach.19 Then, in 1980, everything changed. 
The case that changed everything was City of Mobile v. Bolden.20 
In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, a plurality agreed that 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was a mere codification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.21 Section 2 thus added nothing of consequence 
to the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment. The plurality 
interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment quite narrowly, to protect only 
the formal right to register and vote, and not against vote dilution.22 In 
turn, the plurality offered that the Fourteenth Amendment continued 
to protect against minority vote dilution, but only when plaintiffs 
could show that the challenged practices were adopted for racially 
discriminatory purposes.23 This holding was “devastating,” according 
to Armand Derfner, a leading civil rights lawyer.24 The high factual 
 
Fair Representation, and the Necessary Question of Judicial Will, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
423 (2005) (documenting the importance of judicial will to the outcome of voting rights cases). 
 18. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). 
 19. White v. Regester, 412 US 755, 769 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 US 124, 158–60 
(1971); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 20. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 21. Id. at 60–61. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 66–70. 
 24. Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 145, 149 (Chandler Davidson ed. 1984). 
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threshold established by the intent standard essentially brought the 
adjudication of dilution cases to an end.25 
Congress responded to the plurality’s reading of section 2 in the 
1982 Amendments to the Act.26 Much has been said and written about 
what Congress in fact did and did not do.27 For the purposes of this 
Essay, it is important to note only that Congress sought to overturn 
City of Mobile’s conclusion that section 2 of the Act, while codifying 
the Fifteenth Amendment, incorporated that Amendment’s intent 
standard.28 The evidence is quite clear on this point. Hence the 
question at the heart of this Essay: could Congress take on the Court 
and essentially overturn the City of Mobile decision? 
One response to this question argues that Congress was well 
within its legitimate range of constitutional authority. After all, the 
1982 Amendments were only overturning the Court’s statutory 
conclusion about the proper meaning of section 2. While Congress 
may not supersede the Court’s constitutional decisions, Congress can 
indeed correct those statutory decisions where the Court gets the 
interpretation of the statute wrong. This is precisely what Congress 
did. But to say that Congress may correct the Court’s mistaken 
interpretations of a statute is not to say that Congress has the power 
to do so. For purposes of section 2 as amended in 1982, then, the 
question was whether Congress could use its power to enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment to overturn the Court’s holding in City of 
Mobile. 
This Essay argues below that this is a far more difficult question 
than often acknowledged. Congress originally enacted the Voting 
Rights Act under its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.29 
Taken literally, this means Congress had power to enforce whatever 
the Fifteenth Amendment means, that is, what the plurality in City of 
Mobile held that it means. This is clearly not an easy question to 
answer. To be sure, constitutional scholars spent a lot of time and 
energy in the late 1990s debating the boundaries of the remedial–
substantive divide at the heart of Congress’ enforcement powers. This 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973). 
 27. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 566–94 (3rd ed. 2007) 
(providing a sampling of critiques of the amendments). 
 28. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.S.C.A.N. 177, 205. 
 29. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). 
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Essay does not engage this debate. The point is simply that a very 
good argument existed in 1982 against what Congress did. Were the 
Court inclined to strike down section 2 of the Act as Congress 
understood it post-1982, it had the means to do so. It only needed the 
requisite will to take on the political branches. 
The notion that the Court might strike down the amended Act 
was not an idle worry, at least not in the early 1980s. To see this, one 
need only examine the evolution of the Voting Rights Act at the 
hands of the Warren and Burger Courts. In the early days, the Warren 
Court was clearly on the side of Congress and the Johnson 
administration. This is the best way to explain the Katzenbach cases, 
Allen v. Virginia State Board of Elections,30 and Gaston County v. 
United States.31 The 1968 election changed everything, and President 
Nixon soon molded the Supreme Court into a more conservative 
body. By the mid-1970s, the Court had clearly shifted to the right.32 
The Court was no longer on the side of the civil rights coalition that 
made passage of the Act possible. The demise of the Act appeared 
possible, even likely. 
This was the setting on April 22, 1980, the day the Court decided 
City of Mobile.33 Notably, this was also the day the Court decided City 
of Rome v. United States, a case challenging the constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act.34 When considered together, these two cases set 
the Court on a collision course with the past both as an institutional 
question and as a matter of law. On the first, it was clear that the 
Court had shifted its posture about what the Act meant. While the 
early cases—from Allen35 to Perkins v. Matthews36 and Georgia v. 
United States37—were broad and creative interpretations of 
Congressional intent, the Burger Court settled on a narrower 
approach. The Burger Court’s new Justices made clear that they 
would not acquiesce silently to the past,38 and the views of some of the 
 
 30. Allen v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 31. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 295 (1969). 
 32. See generally Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (adopting a narrow 
interpretation of section 5 of the Act); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) 
(upholding land annexation under section 5 of the Act in the face of dilution of black voting 
strength). 
 33. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 34. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 159 (1980). 
 35. Allen, 393 U.S. at 544. 
 36. Perkins v. Matthews , 400 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 37. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973). 
 38. See, e.g., Perkins, 400 U.S. at 397 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Given the decision in 
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old Justices—namely Justice White39—were clearly evolving. City of 
Mobile fit squarely within that narrative. 
This change in judicial posture on the part of the Court had a 
direct effect on the constitutionality of section 2. After all, if section 1 
of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited only intentional racial 
discrimination, as decided by the plurality in City of Mobile, could 
Congress now outlaw practices that have only a discriminatory effect 
under its power to enforce this Amendment? This was the question in 
City of Rome.40 Would the Court look to the past and its deferential 
mode of review, as in the Katzenbach cases, or would it continue its 
recent retrenchment? 
In an opinion authored by Justice Marshall, the Court looked to 
the past and adopted a deferential mode of review. The Court turned 
to Katzenbach and its holding that Congress could outlaw literacy 
tests that were not on their face discriminatory if they “perpetuate[] 
the effects of past discrimination.”41 The Court quoted from 
Katzenbach’s language referring to the enforcement powers as “a 
positive grant of legislative power,”42 and Oregon v. Mitchell’s 
conclusion that Congress could outlaw literacy tests nationwide even 
if their implementation was devoid of any traces of purposeful 
discrimination.43 
City of Rome was thus a watershed moment in the life of the 
Voting Rights Act. Much can be said for Justice Marshall’s opinion, 
and it would be easy to defend it. But far more important than its 
actual holding is the fact that the Court simply chose the path of least 
resistance. Rather than engage the difficult arguments at the heart of 
the case, the Court chose instead to defer to its own past. Make no 
mistake, this was a decision the Court did not need to make. Powerful 
and persuasive counter arguments were readily available. 
 
Allen v. State Board of Elections, a case not cited by the District Court, I join in the judgment of 
reversal and in the order of remand.”). 
 39. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting for the first time in cases interpreting the Voting 
Rights Act). 
 40. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) (“We hold that, even if § 1 of 
the Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court 
foreclose any argument that Congress may not, pursuant to § 2, outlaw voting practices that are 
discriminatory in effect.”). 
 41. Id. at 176. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 176–77. 
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The constitutional question at the heart of City of Rome was the 
same question at the heart of the constitutional debate over section 2. 
Once the Court held that a Fifteenth Amendment violation 
demanded a prior finding of purposeful racial discrimination, could 
Congress seek to enforce this Amendment by requiring only a finding 
of discriminatory effect? Put more forcefully, it may be argued that 
the 1982 Amendments to section 2 of the Act were a direct rebuke to 
the Court and its power—a moment in time when Congress asserted 
its power to interpret the Constitution alongside the Court. If one 
were inclined to histrionics, these Amendments might even be seen as 
challenging the canonical Marbury v. Madison and its assertion that it 
is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”44 It would be hard to believe that the Justices 
would not have something to say about that. But they have not. To 
this day, the Court has not addressed the constitutionality of the 
amended section 2. 
One reason for this silence may be that section 5 of the Act—its 
preclearance provision—has proven to be far more controversial. In 
asking select states and local jurisdictions to preclear any and all 
changes to their voting laws, section 5 essentially places these 
jurisdictions in a status akin to a receivership. To critics, this bears an 
unmistakable resemblance to Reconstruction. Thus, if section 5 is 
deemed constitutional, certainly the far less controversial section 2, 
which simply sought to codify the Fifteenth Amendment, is 
constitutional as well. In recent years, however, one of the available 
counter-arguments finally garnered a Court majority, thus forcing us 
to reconsider the Court’s silence on the constitutionality of section 2. 
The case was City of Boerne v. Flores.45 
II. WHY THE LEGAL MODEL FAILS: CITY OF BOERNE AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 
City of Boerne involved a direct confrontation between Congress 
and the Court. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that 
neutral laws of general applicability could interfere with the free 
exercise of religion, subject to rational basis review; only laws that 
were not neutral and generally applicable were subject to strict 
 
 44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 45. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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scrutiny.46 In direct response to the Smith decision, Congress enacted 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).47 In so doing, 
Congress sought to overturn Smith and protect religious liberty in a 
way that the Court’s prior decision had not.48 
The Court struck RFRA down.49 The Court held that the 
enforcement power at the heart of the Reconstruction Amendments 
is at its root a “remedial,” not “substantive,” power.50 Not to be 
misunderstood, the Court offered that this power is “broad,” and that 
Congress may “prohibit[] conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional.”51 However, Congress was still not free to determine 
the meaning of constitutional rights.52 This remained the work of the 
Court.53 Congress may only prohibit constitutional conduct when 
seeking to “deter or remed[y] constitutional violations” as previously 
defined by the Court.54 More specifically, “there must be a congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.”55 
RFRA failed this test. To the Court, the statute “[was] so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot 
be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”56 This conclusion required an empirical 
judgment on the part of the Court between the proportion of 
constitutional violations in the world at large and violations of the 
statute.57 When the proportion of constitutional violations was large in 
relation to statutory violations, then the statute would be considered 
remedial and thus constitutional. This is another way of saying that 
the statute would survive judicial review when the Court determined 
that the proportion of constitutional violations targeted by the law 
was large. In contrast, when the Court determined that the proportion 
of such violations was small, the statute would then be considered 
 
 46. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 511. 
 50. Id. at 517. 
 51. Id. at 518. 
 52. Id. at 518–19. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 518. 
 55. Id. at 520. 
 56. Id. at 532–533. 
 57. Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 743, 746 (1998). 
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substantive. If few violations were deemed to exist, then Congress 
would be essentially changing the rules of the game to reach behavior 
that is not unconstitutional.58 
The Court’s conclusion raises myriad questions. For the purposes 
of this Essay, two related questions are particularly poignant. How 
does the Court know when a set of facts falls on one side of the divide 
or the other? How many cases does the Court need in order to decide 
that a set of facts will be enough to make a statute remedial or 
substantive?59 Without question, these are essentially questions of 
degree, the kinds of questions that belong to the legislature, not the 
courts. But the majority in City of Boerne clearly thought otherwise. 
The City of Boerne decision should have civil rights advocates on 
edge. Many federal “enforcement” statutes that go far beyond the 
judicial interpretation of the right that Congress sought to enforce 
remain on the books. The Voting Rights Act is one such statute.60 To 
be sure, it might appear that the Voting Rights Act remains on safe 
constitutional ground. But this is only true if the Court decides to 
follow its longstanding precedents. The Court could also choose to 
accommodate section 2 within its new congruent and proportional 
standard.61 It is hard to be optimistic, however, for three reasons. 
First, as noted above, the constitutional question framed by the 
Court in City of Boerne is a question of empirical judgment. This is 
now a subjective inquiry about how much racial discrimination exists 
in voting procedures and policies. The point was easy to make in 1965, 
as the record was replete with evidence of racial discrimination. It 
remains to be seen whether Justice Kennedy and the new 
conservative majority will look to the current state of affairs and 
make a similar conclusion. 
Second, it is important to note that the remedial–substantive 
distinction never garnered a majority of the Court until City of 
Boerne. Prior to City of Boerne, the distinction had only been made in 
isolated dissenting opinions. According to then-Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for himself and Justice Stewart in City of Rome, “[i]f the 
 
 58. See id. at 770. 
 59. See id. (observing that the difference between a substantive statute and a remedial one 
“depends on whether the Court thinks there are enough cases of unconstitutionality to justify 
dispensing with complete proof of unconstitutionality”). 
 60. Id. at 747 n.19. 
 61. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and 
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1998). 
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enforcement power is construed as a ‘remedial’ grant of authority, it is 
this Court’s duty to ensure that a challenged congressional Act does 
no more than ‘enforce’ the limitations on state power established in 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”62 To hold otherwise, he 
suggested, would be to allow Congress to essentially amend the 
Constitution by statute.63 Justice Harlan made a similar argument in 
his dissenting opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan.64 
These dissenting views commanded a majority within the Court 
for the first time in City of Boerne. Much can be said about this shift 
within the Court,65 but far more important is the fact that the shift 
took place almost unannounced. The Court interpreted the relevant 
precedents either as consistent with its conclusion or else as 
irrelevant.66 What the Court will do with the next case, it is impossible 
to say. But if City of Boerne serves as guide, it is hard to believe that 
the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982 will survive this kind of 
judicial review. 
Finally, while striking down RFRA as outside Congress’ 
enforcement power, it is often noted that the Court offered the Voting 
Rights Act as an exemplary statute. The Court underscored often how 
RFRA was different in degree and kind from the VRA.67 To 
supporters of the VRA, this is a very clear signal that the statute 
remains on safe ground. But this reading is far too charitable to 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in City of Boerne. Justice 
Kennedy did not posit the Act as an exemplary statute; rather, his use 
of the VRA was mainly a nod to section 5 of the Act and the 
congressional suspension of literacy tests nationwide.68 Section 2 
remained conspicuously absent from the discussion. One reason for 
this absence may be that section 5 is widely regarded as posing the 
strongest challenge to our constitutional commitment to principles of 
federalism and the division of power between the national 
government and the states. 
 
 62. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 211 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 210–11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 64. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 688 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 65. City of Boerne was a shift, even though the Court’s opinion (authored by Justice 
Kennedy) argued that its view on this question dated back to the founding. See City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)). 
 66. See Laycock, supra note 57, at 748. 
 67. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. 
 68. See id. at 533. 
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The concerns regarding the constitutionality of section 2 engages 
the section 5 debate, but only at the periphery. Since the 1982 
Amendments, section 2 must be understood as presenting a 
separation of powers question. This is a question about judicial review 
and constitutional authority to interpret the constitutional text. Of 
note, this happens to be the kind of question that engages the Court’s 
attention quite readily. The Justices are not terribly interested in 
sharing the Court’s self-appointed duty to interpret the constitutional 
text, especially of late.69 
Once the Court focuses on the constitutionality of section 2, it will 
find arguments for striking it down close at hand. In his dissent to City 
of Rome, Justice Rehnquist offered the following argument: 
After our decision City of Mobile there is little doubt that Rome 
has not engaged in constitutionally prohibited conduct. I also do 
not believe that prohibition of these changes can genuinely be 
characterized as a remedial exercise of congressional enforcement 
power. Thus, the result of the Court’s holding is that Congress 
effectively has the power to determine for itself that this conduct 
violates the Constitution. This result violates previously well-
established distinctions between the Judicial Branch and the 
Legislative or Executive Branches of the Federal Government.70 
Justice Rehnquist supported his argument by citing to some of the 
Court’s most important decisions on judicial power—U.S. v. Nixon 
and Marbury v. Madison. His dissent in City of Rome shows that the 
argument for striking down section 2 as unconstitutional would not be 
a difficult argument to make. 
In the end, the Court may continue to assume the constitutionality 
of section 2 in perpetuity. Or perhaps the Court will finally subject 
section 2 to judicial review and conclude that the law fits comfortably 
within its established precedent. The arguments to find section 2 
constitutionally permissible are available;71 whether they are likely to 
prove persuasive to the Court is the subject of the next Part. 
 
 69. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Larry D. 
Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). 
 70. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 210–11 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 71. See Karlan, supra note 61, at 731–41. 
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III. ATTITUDINALIST JUDGING AND STRATEGIC JUSTICE 
It is an axiom of judicial decision-making that legal tools guide 
judicial opinions; legal arguments and binding precedents direct 
judges to the “correct” outcome. The law does all the heavy lifting and 
the Justices, like good Platonic Guardians, only need to discern what 
its teachings are. Most importantly, the Justices’ ideologies and policy 
views play no role at all. 
This view has a long and distinguished lineage. According to Chief 
Justice Marshall: 
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. 
When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal 
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course 
prescribed by law; and when that is discerned, it is the duty of the 
Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the 
purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the 
purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other 
words, to the will of the law.72 
This is an argument for the role of law as central to the outcome 
of any case. The argument concedes that judicial discretion is 
unavoidable and even necessary. But even when discretion is 
necessary, a judge remains subservient to the law and nothing else. A 
judge must do what the Constitution or the legislature demands, 
always casting aside her preferred political outcomes. 
In a nutshell, Marshall’s position encapsulates the modern debate 
about judicial behavior. One side of the debate—the legal model—
views judges as tightly bounded and constrained by the law, guided by 
nothing but what the law demands. As the late Chief Justice Burger 
once said, “Judges . . . rule on the basis of law, not public opinion, and 
they should be totally indifferent to the pressures of the times.”73 This 
is a view central to modern legal education, for it assumes that 
reasoning from specific principles will inexorably lead to a given 
result. Unsurprisingly, its cast of supporters is both distinguished and 
long: from Deans Langdell and Wechsler to federal judges and 
Justices alike.74 
This is an intuitively attractive claim. The very nature of judicial 
 
 72. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824). 
 73. CHUCK HENNING, THE WIT AND WISDOM OF POLITICS 107 (1992). 
 74. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (1997). 
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decision-making, and particularly the way in which judges go about 
doing their jobs, makes this claim almost self-evident. The argument is 
simply that judges are not free to answer legal questions any way they 
wish; rather, they are constrained by institutional structures designed 
to limit their available choices. One such constraint is the principle of 
stare decisis, the notion that judges must respect and adhere to 
existing legal authority unless they provide good reason for setting 
precedent aside.75 Another important constraint is the nature of the 
judiciary. When deciding cases, judges must give reasons for their 
decisions,76 and, in so doing, they must attempt to align their decisions 
with past law or explain why they diverge from it. Judges also must 
take cases as they come to them, and may not set their own agendas. 
In response to this view, the attitudinal school contends that 
judges decide cases in accordance with their personal policy 
preferences. In the words of Harold Spaeth and Jeff Segal,  
the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case 
vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the Justices. Simply 
put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely 
conservative. Marshall voted the way he did because he is 
extremely liberal.77 
The empirical evidence, while subject to deserved criticism,78 is both 
robust and accurate.79 Or in the words of Frank Cross, “political 
 
 75. See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 
1032–34 (1996) (concluding that stare decisis constrains the Supreme Court’s decision-making); 
Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices’ Values 
on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049, 1060–61 (1996) (presenting 
evidence that Supreme Court Justices vote to reaffirm precedents that conflict with their 
apparent policy preferences). But see Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of 
Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 
(1996) (presenting an empirical case that Supreme Court Justices are not influenced by 
precedent with which they disagree); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and 
Stare Decisis: A Response, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1063, 1074–76 (1996) (contending that the 
evidence showing that the doctrine of stare decisis is a legal norm does not show that the Justices 
are influenced by precedent with which they disagree). 
 76. See generally HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
(1992); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995) (analyzing the logic 
behind judicial reasoning). 
 77. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 65 (2002). 
 78. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1749–
52 (2003). 
 79. See ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 362 
(1996) (quoting Professor Spaeth) (explaining that the model is accurate “on more than 9 out of 
10 predictions of judicial behavior”) 
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scientists have produced abundant support for the attitudinal model, 
far more than legal scholars have mustered on behalf of more 
traditional legal models.”80 This body of work is extensive and holds 
an impressive list of adherents.81 
The attitudinalist school is keenly aware—and dismissive—of the 
traditional legal model. As a general matter, these scholars conclude 
that the legal model, a model grounded on the strength of stare decisis 
and legal rules as guiding principles, has little effect on judicial 
behavior.82 Put another way, legal precedent and doctrine play no role 
in judicial opinions. To be sure, a judge will often underscore the view 
that, while disagreeing with the particular opinion she is then 
authoring, the “law” leaves her little choice.83 And other times, an 
opinion simply “won’t write,” so a judge will have to turn away from a 
conclusion she previously deemed correct.84 These examples are 
exceptions, however, not the norm.85 The law is so fluid and malleable 
that legal precedent often exists to support both sides of a case. Even 
when judges argue that their ideological preferences must play no 
role in the outcome of a case,86 attitudinalists argue that it is hard to 
take these arguments at face value, as these words are often used to 
disguise the judges’ personal preferences.87 
These two models can be harmonized. In fact, the best way to 
understand judicial behavior is by recognizing that the Justices are 
single-minded pursuers of legal policy.88 The claim is one of judges 
setting agendas and strategizing about securing their preferred 
outcomes.89 The Justices consider various factors in determining the 
 
 80. Cross, supra note 74, at 254. 
 81. See id. at 275–79 (discussing leading examples of this work). 
 82. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 75. 
 83. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 315 (1990) (collecting cases). 
 84. Schauer, supra note 76, at 652. 
 85. See Cross, supra note 74, at 270–72 (discussing these examples and concomitant 
criticism). 
 86. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of 
Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619 (1985) 
(making such an argument). 
 87. See Cross, supra note 74, at 271 (suggesting that protestations of disagreement with an 
outcome “may disguise the attitudinal end of the judges”). 
 88. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–10 (1998) 
(“[Justices] are, in the opinion of many, ‘single-minded seekers of legal policy.’”). 
 89. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (1991) (addressing agenda setting within the Supreme Court); see also Lee 
Epstein et al., The Claim of Issue Creation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
845 (1996) (presenting evidence that Justices are policy seekers, not issue creators); Kevin T. 
McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issues, Agendas, and Decision Making on the Supreme Court, 40 
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outcome of a case, from existing law to their own policy preferences 
and the preferences of their fellow Justices.90 They must also account 
for the existing political climate at the time of their decision and the 
positions of the relevant policy branches of government.91 To be sure, 
there are times when the Justices will follow established precedents 
even if it is against their preferred positions. But it is also true that 
legal constraints last for as long as the Justices do not disagree with 
the outcome in question; when they disagree, legal constraints are 
easily overcome.92 
Indeed, it is hard to see the Justices as anything but strategic 
policy-makers. This fact will affect the looming battle over the 
constitutionality of section 2 of the Act. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF SECTION 2 
In his concurring opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft, Justice Kennedy 
reminded his audience that “[r]ace cannot be the predominant factor 
in redistricting,” and yet, “considerations of race that would doom a 
redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be 
what save it under § 5.”93 This was unwelcome news for friends of the 
Voting Rights Act. Justices Thomas and Scalia have similarly 
remonstrated against the use of race in elections and the 
 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1996) (arguing that Justices will shape the cases before the Court to 
further policy goals). 
 90. See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision 
Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992). 
 91. See id. at 330–33; see also Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme 
Court as a Strategic National Policy-Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 585 (2001) (“We argue that, 
given the institutional constraints imposed on the Court, the Justices cannot effectuate their 
own policy and institutional goals without taking account of the goals and likely actions of the 
members of the other branches. When they are attentive to external actors, Justices find that the 
best way to have a long-term effect on the nature and content of the law is to adapt their 
decisions to the preferences of these others.”). 
 92. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 73 (1984) (“Worst of 
all, occasionally the Court has skipped over difficult standing issues entirely in order to proceed 
directly to the merits of attractive cases.”); see also Cross, supra note 74, at 265–275 (discussing 
the superficial constraints provided by the legal model); see generally Girardeau Spann, Color-
Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1424 (1995) (“When minority plaintiffs file 
programmatic challenges to widespread patterns of racial discrimination, the Court typically 
denies standing because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of 
particularized gain resulting from a favorable judgment. Such a showing is required to establish 
a justiciable ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’ However, when nonminority plaintiffs file similar 
programmatic challenges to affirmative action programs, the Court typically grants standing, 
even though the plaintiffs are equally unable to demonstrate a high likelihood of particularized 
gain.”). 
 93. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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constitutionality of the VRA.94 Justice Alito and the Chief Justice 
have a much smaller record, but their contributions to this debate are 
not encouraging for supporters of the Act. 
The Voting Rights Act looks to be in serious trouble. Five votes 
are easily at hand to strike down the Act in its entirety. This Part 
considers the constitutionality of section 2 when in the hands of the 
conservative majority. The first section describes the Court as a 
national policymaker and as an institution that often tracks existing 
public opinion. This section further explains, however, that the Court 
seldom sides with the interests of racial minorities.95 To be clear, this 
section does not take the view that racial justice will materialize only 
when the interests of middle and upper-middle class whites converge 
with the interests of people of color.96 The claim is subtler. In looking 
to the available options, the Court often fails to see the very things 
that people of color recognize as central to the case. This point may be 
analogized to what some legal scholars have labeled as the “white 
transparency thesis.”97 Put a different way, public opinion splits along 
a racial divide and, not surprisingly, so does the Court. As a result, 
those moments when the Court appears to side with minority 
interests warrant an explanation. 
The second section contends that the history of the Act follows a 
clear historical trend. Early in the life of the Act, the public at large 
understood the Act as a necessary yet temporary remedy to the 
obvious racial discrimination that existed in select jurisdictions. Once 
section 2 of the Act took center stage after the 1982 Amendments, the 
 
 94. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 512 (2006) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 907 (1994) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 95. In the words of Randall Kennedy, for example: 
From the Civil War until the middle of this century, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of laws and practices under which Negroes were reduced to second 
class citizenship. There have been occasions on which the Court has made crucial 
contributions to racial justice. But overall, and even during those brief but dramatic 
periods when the Court has demonstrated unusual solicitude for the rights of 
minorities, the Court's performance as a defender of those rights has been strikingly 
deficient. 
Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor 
Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1623 (1986). 
 96. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“[T]he fourteenth amendment, standing alone, 
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the 
remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper class whites.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and 
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993). 
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purpose of the Act shifted in notable ways. Rather than remedial 
legislation, the statute took the form of an all-purpose anti-
discrimination law, targeted no longer at the racial discrimination that 
led to the historic passage of the Act a generation before. This is 
where we find ourselves today. 
Thus the question that now faces the Court: is section 2 of the Act 
a legitimate response to the problem of racial discrimination as 
experienced in the twenty-first century? In a move that will surprise 
no one, this final section argues that this issue—and the future of the 
Act—rests in the hands of Justice Kennedy, whose signals as of late 
are mixed at best. 
1. Institutional Justice Across Time: Race and the Court 
Consider first the role of an unelected, unaccountable judiciary in 
a mature Democracy. This debate has been dominated in the last 
generation by Alexander Bickel’s conception of the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty.”98 Bickel wrote that 
when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act 
or the action of an elected executive it thwarts the will of 
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it 
exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but 
against it. This, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens. . 
. . [I]t is the reason the charge can be made that judicial review is 
undemocratic.99 
Since Bickel’s influential contribution, constitutional scholars 
have spent countless hours attempting to diffuse the 
“countermajoritarian” dilemma.100 Yet this turns out to be a far less 
 
 98. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (2nd ed. 1986); see also HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, 
MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 55 (1958) (“Whatever the logical support for the 
theory [of judicial review], it cannot be found in the philosophy of democracy if by democracy 
we mean majority rule; whatever the practical justification, it cannot be found in the defense of 
fundamental rights against the assault of misguided or desperate majorities.”). 
 99. BICKEL, supra note 98 at 16–17. 
 100. See Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 845 (2001) (analyzing counter-majoritarian assumptions in the law); Robert M. 
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1288 
n.2 (1982) (“The ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ has spawned the central line of constitutional 
scholarship for the last thirty years.”); Steven Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective 
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 712 (1995) (“[R]esponding to the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty has been an important staple on the menu of constitutional 
theory since the appearance of Bickel’s influential book.”); Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: 
The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921, 921 (2001) (“[T]he 
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important question than originally presumed, for the Supreme Court 
seldom strays from majoritarian sentiments. The evidence on this 
point is overwhelming, and for good measure.101 The appointment 
process ensures that the ideology of the Justices is never radically at 
odds with prevailing opinion.102 But a difficulty indeed remains. For 
while majorities often get their way within the Court, communities of 
color seldom do. 
The fact that racial minorities seldom win in the arena of 
American politics is a longstanding dilemma in American society. 
Begin with Alexis de Tocqueville, who recognized in 1835 that “[t]he 
most formidable evil threatening the future of the United States is the 
 
‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ remains—some forty years after its christening—a central 
theme in constitutional scholarship. Indeed, one might say that reconciling judicial review and 
democratic institutions is the goal of almost every major constitutional scholar writing today 
. . . .”); see also Croley, supra note 100, at 712 n.66 (documenting some of the many published 
acknowledgments to Bickel’s influence). 
 101. The work by political scientists is quite consistent on this question. See, e.g., David G. 
Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New 
Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985) (“[T]he judicial activism of the post-New Deal Supreme 
Court was in fact surprisingly consistent with majoritarian principles.”); Robert A. Dahl, 
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 
279, 285 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 570 (2001) (“The fact is, then, that the policy 
views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant 
among the lawmaking majorities of the United States”); see generally, THOMAS R. MARSHALL, 
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The 
Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 468 (1997); Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court: 
Cross-Time Analyses of Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Cases, 48 POL. RES. Q. 61 (1995); 
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Counter-majoritarian 
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
87 (1993); James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, & Robert S. Erikson, Dynamic 
Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543 (1995). Legal scholars reach a similar conclusion. 
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 609 (1993) 
(“[C]ontrary to laments about the counter-majoritarian difficulty, even controversial judicial 
decisions often are majoritarian.”); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (“The Supreme Court does not play the strong 
counter-majoritarian role in defense of individual liberties that popular wisdom ascribes to it.”). 
 102. Dahl, supra note 101, at 284–85; see generally GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITY (1970); Lawrence Baum, Membership Change and Collective Voting 
in the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 3 (1992); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court 
and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 796 (1975); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. 
Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1994); Jeffrey 
A. Segal, Measuring Change on the Supreme Court: Examining Alternative Models, 29 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 461 (1985). This leading view finds support among influential legal scholars as well. 
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“If the Courts are free to 
write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it the way the majority wants; the 
appointment and confirmation process will see to that.”). 
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presence of the blacks on their soil.”103 More than a century later, 
Gunnar Myrdal identified this racial problem as the “American 
Dilemma.”104 Presently, matters are not much better, at least in terms 
of public opinion. In the words of Don Kinder and Lynn Sanders, 
“[n]o doubt the most striking feature of public opinion on race is how 
emphatically black and white Americans disagree with each other.”105 
This division is such, Kinder and Sanders argue, that “[t]he racial 
difference is a racial divide.”106 They conclude in language that casts 
serious doubt on the Court’s understanding of the role of race in 
society: 
 The huge and evidently persistent racial divide in opinion also 
amounts to a dramatic disconfirmation of the “liberal expectancy” 
so confidently issued from so many quarters not so long ago. From 
this perspective, racial and ethnic categories were about to become 
obsolete, irrelevant to any serious political analysis. The clear 
expectation was that “the kinds of features that divide one group 
from another would inevitably lose their weight and sharpness in 
modern and modernizing societies.” It hasn’t happened, of course, 
not in the United States, and not around the world, where we have 
seen a murderous eruption of conflict organized by ethnicity. 
 The racial divide also makes trouble for pluralistic conceptions 
of American society, which portray citizens as pushed and pulled 
by many social forces, such that no single division has any special 
or lasting claim. Pluralists remind us that Americans are divided 
from one another by more than just race: by religion, ethnicity, 
class, religion, the organizations they join, and much more. In such 
social diversity lies enormous political significance. In the pluralist 
view, social factors, taken all together, “form a great web of 
crosscutting axes that divide and redivide the public,” thereby 
inhibiting “the emergence of any single profound line of cleavage.” 
Blacks and whites are socially diverse; they are subject to various 
crosscutting pressuresbut this is not enough, evidently, to 
prevent race from emerging as a “single profound line of 
cleavage.”107 
 
 103. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 313 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner 
eds., George Lawrence trans., 1966). 
 104. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY (1944). 
 105. DONALD KINDER & LYNN SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 33 (1997). 
 106. Id. at 18. 
 107. Id. at 33–34; see also THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL WITH MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN 
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Note the repercussions of this conclusion for the previous 
argument about the influence of public opinion on the Court. To say 
that the Court is influenced by public opinion is only to say that the 
Court is influenced by part of the public. A wide swath of American 
society—the swath composed of persons of color—is clearly not as 
influential as the white public. If a chasm exists in public opinion, it is 
clear that the Court is only paying attention to part of the public. Seen 
through the prism of history, the Court seldom sides with the interests 
of people of color.108 
Consider, for example, affirmative action cases. The crux of the 
debate is this: must race become a restricted social and political 
category, off-limits to policy makers and bureaucrats alike? In the 
words of a critic of affirmative action, for example, “one gets beyond 
racism by getting beyond it now; by a complete, resolute, and credible 
commitment never to tolerate in one’s own life—or in the life or 
practices of one’s government—the differential treatment of other 
human beings by race.”109 Conversely, affirmative action supporters 
share Justice Blackmun’s view that in “order to get beyond racism, we 
must first take account of race.”110 Little room for compromise exists 
between these polar opposites: they represent two competing views of 
the world, and neither is more persuasive than the other. 
The Court recognizes that not all uses of race are similarly 
damaging, that racial segregation is not the same as racial integration. 
The problem, however, is that it cannot readily distinguish between 
the two. Put differently, a constitutionally palpable, judicially 
recognizable difference does not exist between segregated schools in 
Brown v. Board of Education111 and integrative efforts by the state to 
remedy perceived racial injustices in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
 
REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); see 
generally KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES, 
AND RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA (1997). 
 108. See e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT 
& MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993); John E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of 
Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 471 (1995) (“The 
Supreme Court’s history indicates that legal theories are of far less importance than the political 
affiliation of the Justices of the Court in determining the outcome of the Supreme Court 
decisions concerning racial minorities.”). 
 109. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979). 
 110. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 111. Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Co.112 It is in order to distinguish between the two that the Court 
deploys its classic test of “strict scrutiny” as applied to race-conscious 
measures: 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such 
race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications 
are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or 
simple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 
“smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the 
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant 
use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means 
chosen “fit” this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no 
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate 
racial prejudice or stereotype.113 
In this telling passage, the Court acknowledges its own limitations 
and purports to develop the strict scrutiny test in direct response to 
these limitations. According to Justice O’Connor, for example, racial 
classifications “carry a danger of stigmatic harm,” and “[u]nless they 
are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote 
notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”114 
These are not constitutional arguments but policy ones, aimed at the 
costs and benefits of the programs in question.115 Further, these 
arguments are made not in light of the Constitution, but in defense of 
a policy view independent of that document. More importantly, these 
arguments are not accepted, uncontroversial understandings of the 
Constitution, but arguments situated within a distinct ideological and 
political framework. These arguments prove persuasive for no better 
reason than the fact that five Justices accept them. This is raw 
attitudinalism, plain and simple. 
The argument that a racial divide exists in American public 
opinion poses an immediate challenge. Those times when the Court 
sides with people of color are aberrations in need of an explanation. 
 
 112. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 113. Id. at 493. 
 114. Id. This is a popular argument among critics of race conscious policy making. See, e.g., 
THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 118 (1984) (“Among the insidious 
dangers are the undermining of minority and female self-confidence.”); Alstyne, supra note 109, 
at 787 n.38 (arguing that affirmative action plans “unquestionably impose a racial stigma on 
those who benefit by them . . . .”). 
 115. See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality 
of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994). 
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Brown presents the paradigmatic example.116 One answer to the 
Court’s holding in Brown may point to the commands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its prescription against racial 
classifications.117 Alternatively, one may attribute the holding to a deep 
change of heart in the part of the Court and its members, a desire to 
right wrongs, to “do justice.”118 This Essay subscribes to neither 
reading. Instead, it sides with those accounts of the case that look for 
explanations apart from the interests of people of color. For example, 
Derrick Bell attributed the Brown holding to what he termed the 
“interest convergence dilemma.”119 According to Bell, “[t]he interest 
of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only 
when it converges with the interests of whites.”120 To his mind, the 
Brown opinion helped further the Cold War strategy of the times.121 
Others explained the decision in terms of foreign relations or a 
changing Southern society.122 These accounts are neither mutually 
exclusive nor does one account extol itself above all others. The point 
is far more limited. Put simply, those moments in the Court’s history 
when a majority sides with the apparent interests of racial minorities 
warrant an explanation. 
Consider in this vein the White Primary Cases, long held to 
epitomize a view of the Court as crusader for racial justice. In Nixon v. 
 
 116. Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). One of my favorite cases, Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), is much harder to explain when placed in institutional and 
historical context. This is not to say that explanations are unavailing, however. See Thomas Wuil 
Joo, New “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil 
Rights and the Development of Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 
355 (1995) (explaining Yick Wo as a precursor to the Court’s solicitude for private property in 
the twentieth century). 
 117. See, e.g., Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decision, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 
429 (1960) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the “disadvantaging of the Negro 
race by law.”). 
 118. Michael Herz, “Do Justice!” Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111, 140 
(1996). 
 119. Bell, supra note 96, at 523. I must note Professor Bell’s concession that “[r]acial 
justice—or its appearance—may, from time to time, be counted among the interests deemed 
important by the courts and by society’s policymakers.” Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 524 (“[T]he decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America's 
struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world 
peoples.”). 
 122. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 
68–98 (1988) (discussing racial politics in the international arena during and after World War 
II); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 
7, 14–75 (1994) (discussing the growth of black power in the context of World War II and the 
Cold War). 
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Herndon,123 the Court examined a state statute providing that “in no 
event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic Party’s 
primary election held in the State of Texas.” The answer to the Court 
was obvious.124 This was a clear case of racial discrimination, and the 
Court struck it down accordingly, on Equal Protection grounds.125 The 
state responded to the Court’s ruling with a second statute, this time 
delegating to the political parties the “power to prescribe the 
qualifications of [their] own members.”126 The reason for this 
subsequent statute was clear, and the Court acted accordingly. In 
Nixon v. Condon, the Court explained that the parties had become, 
for all intents and purposes, “the organs of the state itself.”127 As a 
result, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment “lays a 
duty upon the Court to level by its judgments these barriers of 
color.”128 The Court struck down the amended statute. The state 
Democratic Party did not relent in its attempts to exclude Nixon, and 
blacks in general, from participating in primary elections. At first, the 
Court stepped aside and allowed the exclusions to stand on state 
action grounds.129 Ultimately, however, the Court proved equal to the 
task. First in Smith v. Allwright,130 and, within the next decade, in Terry 
v. Adams,131 the Court held its ground against the Texas Democratic 
party and its racist design. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court upheld the right of black voters in Texas to take part in the 
state’s electoral system. 
These cases provide examples of the Court protecting discrete and 
insular minorities. Much can be said for this view in the abstract, 
though it soon runs into difficult objections. If one takes the view that 
the Court had set out to protect the interests of people of color, how 
can the initial disposition of the Brown case be explained? Initially, a 
majority of the Court sided against the plaintiffs in Brown. Only after 
the appointment of Chief Justice Warren and a second oral argument 
did the Court unanimously side with the plaintiffs.132 A view of the 
Court as racial crusader prior to the advent of the Warren Court is 
 
 123. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927). 
 124. Id. (explaining that “the answer does not seem . . . open to a doubt”) 
 125. Id. at 541. 
 126. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932). 
 127. Id. at 88. 
 128. Id. at 89. 
 129. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1935). 
 130. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). 
 131. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953). 
 132. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 162–63 (1982). 
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implausible.133 
An alternative explanation of the White Primary Cases is more 
attractive. Rather than seeing the Court as a defender of racial 
minorities’ rights, these cases are better understood as voting rights 
cases, not about racial discrimination. In other words, the Court in 
these cases was simply moving towards the eventual view of the right 
to vote as fundamental.134 Further, and especially concerning the 
White Primary Cases, one may posit a very persuasive account of the 
Court’s actions under the lock-up theory.135 According to this theory, 
the Court is clearing the channels of political representation.136 This 
account thus views the question as one of democratic politics, not 
race. 
2. Individual Justice: Race and Attitudes 
This understanding of the White Primary Cases helps make sense 
of the Court’s historical deference to the constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights Act. The issue has been about the rights of minority 
communities, to be sure, but more than that, about the right to vote 
and the clearing of channels of representation.137 In its early days, 
public opinion sided squarely with the adoption of the VRA and, as 
expected, so did the Court. 
But things might be taking a turn for the worse in two ways. It is 
likely that public opinion is no longer on the side of the Act, at least 
when deployed in furtherance of majority-minority districts. It is also 
true that, at least in the eyes of some Justices, the jurisprudence under 
 
 133. This is not to say that the Warren Court stands alone in an institutional vacuum, for the 
Vinson Court had begun to plant uncertain and tentative seeds in cases decided in the late 
1940s. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (granting relief for the plaintiffs yet refusing to 
rule on the continuing constitutionality of Plessy’s separate-but-equal holding); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (declaring that state enforced restrictive covenants violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment). Rather, it is to say that the Court began its decisive, if pragmatic, 
march against racial injustice under the aegis of the Warren Court. 
 134. See ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., supra note 27, at 95. 
 135. Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes borrow the notion of lock-ups from the corporate 
governance context, which they describe as “a variety of devices that constrain the effectiveness 
of the voting power of shareholders by entrenching the incumbent position of firm 
management.” Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of 
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN L. REV. 643, 648 (1998) . 
 136. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Issacharoff & 
Pildes, supra note 135, at 652–68. (analyzing the White Primary Cases as an example of the 
Supreme Court unlocking the channels of political representation). 
 137. With apologies to Dean Ely. See ELY, supra note 136 at 105–36 (devoting a chapter to 
the concept of courts “clearing the channels of political change”). 
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section 2 of the Act has ceased to worry about the Act’s original 
purpose of ensuring equal electoral opportunities for voters of 
color.138 Instead, critics now consider section 2 to be an all-purpose 
anti-discrimination provision, no different from much derided 
affirmative action plans. Within the Court, the conservative Justices 
have made clear their doubts about the statute. 
The shift in perception can be traced the early 1990s. By this time, 
blacks and Latinos were both registering and voting without much 
impediment. The Act had been quite successful in ridding the political 
process of the kind of discrimination that led to its passage in 1965. 
Rather than protect voters of color from the vicissitudes of the 
political process, the charge could be leveled that section 2 of the Act 
became yet another means through which partisans could rig the 
political process for partisan gain. This is not to say that the Act had 
outlived its usefulness, but to explain the growing reservations among 
the Court and commentators about the need for the Act. Indeed, the 
Shaw cases139 make sense in this vein, when understood as a series of 
cases concerning politics and not race. Once blacks and Latinos joined 
the political community in vast numbers, the manipulation of the Act 
for political gain became a real concern, or, in fairness, the use of race 
as political tool and not as a response to existing racial discrimination 
became a concern. Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in Holder v. 
Hall140 makes precisely this point, a sentiment with which Justice 
Scalia agrees. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Miller v. 
Johnson141 may be understood similarly. 
It is clear that five Justices on the Court have strong reservations 
about the use of race in general and the modern uses of section 2 of 
the Act in particular. It remains to be seen whether the Court will 
take the next step and strike down the Act as an illegitimate exercise 
of Congressional power. 
 
 138. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 512 (2006) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court’s jurisprudence continues to 
drift ever further from the Act’s purpose of ensuring minority voters equal opportunities.”). 
 139. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 140. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893–94 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing how 
the Voting Rights Act has been turned into something different than what it was designed for). 
 141. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that Georgia’s redistricting plan 
violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
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3. The Swing Vote: Justice Kennedy 
It is no secret that the future of the Act rests in the hands of 
Justice Kennedy. It is also true that his record on race questions is not 
encouraging,142 nor is his particular record on VRA cases. Think only 
of his Miller v. Johnson and Presley v. Etowah County Commission143 
opinions for support. From the moment Justice Kennedy joined the 
Court, he has consistently cast his vote against the interests of racial 
minorities. Consequently, the future of the Act appears bleak indeed. 
But Justice Kennedy has also authored some opinions, such as 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry,144 and 
even Bartlett v. Strickland,145 that seem out of character for him. These 
opinions offer a glimmer of hope for supporters of the VRA. 
Consider first the Texas gerrymandering case, LULAC. In LULAC, 
the Court examined the notorious DeLay gerrymander,146 the mid-
decade redistricting plan designed to align the state congressional 
districts more closely with the partisan composition of Texas.147 
LULAC is significant for its vote dilution discussion, and particularly 
its conclusion that the Texas plan violated the section 2 rights of 
Latino voters in the state. According to Justice Kennedy, in an opinion 
joined by the four liberal Justices, the state violated the rights of 
Latinos within a district when it removed some Latinos and placed 
them in a neighboring district because otherwise they would soon 
gain the right to select a majority of their choice.148 In Kennedy’s 
words, “the State took away [the Latinos’] opportunity because they 
were about to exercise it.”149 Notably, this was the first time that 
plaintiffs of color prevailed in a vote dilution claim in the Supreme 
Court.150 LULAC is the case in which the Chief Justice remarked that 
 
 142. Consider his concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District Number 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), for a recent example, or his dissent in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 143. Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992). 
 144. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 145. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (holding that section 2 of the Act did not 
protect the right to coalition districts). 
 146. The DeLay gerrymander is named after former House of Representatives Majority 
Leader Tom DeLay, who was a key figure in the 2003 redistricting of Texas’ congressional 
districts. See, e.g., Peter Slover & Robert T. Garrett, Republicans Savoring New Congressional 
Map: Final OK May Come Today, Democrats Promise Lawsuit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 
10, 2003, at A1 (describing the central role DeLay played in the redistricting). 
 147. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 412–13. 
 148. Id. at 438–43. 
 149. Id. at 440. 
 150. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 
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dividing voters by race is a “sordid business.”151 
Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion on the section 2 question that 
looks out of character for him because he took the side of Latino 
voters in the face of a very strong counter-factual interpretation 
available to him. That is to say, Justice Kennedy not only needed to 
reinterpret the facts as provided by the district court, but he also 
needed to argue that these findings were clearly erroneous. Justice 
Kennedy did exactly that, leading to the query raised by Chief Justice 
Roberts in dissent: “[w]hatever the majority believes it is fighting with 
its holding, it is not vote dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity.”152 
Guy Charles is right on this point: Justice Kennedy is clearly bothered 
by the rank partisanship of the plan under review, and his opinion 
may be read as an attempt to force the state to try again.153 Therefore, 
LULAC might not be as hopeful to supporters of the Voting Rights 
Act as generally presumed, for it fits the larger narrative offered 
earlier about those rare moments when the Court sides with minority 
interest. This might not be a race case after all, but a case about 
politics. 
For what might be a more helpful example of Justice Kennedy’s 
evolving views on race, look no further than Bartlett v. Strickland.154 In 
Bartlett, the Court examined the creation of a majority black district 
by the state in order to comply with section 2 of the Act.155 At issue 
was a state constitutional provision that prohibited the splitting of 
county lines in the creation of district lines unless demanded by 
federal law. The state argued that section 2 demanded the creation of 
the majority black district.156 The Supreme Court, in an opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy, disagreed. 
The facts in Bartlett are not as significant as Kennedy’s rousing 
conclusion that “racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are 
not ancient history.”157 In his view, “[m]uch remains to be done to 
ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity.”158 Curiously, 
these were exactly the arguments made by supporters of the Act 
 
1187 (2007). 
 151. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See Charles, supra note 150, at 1196. 
 154. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1239. 
 157. Id. at 1249. 
 158. Id. 
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during the 2006 extension debates. As you read these passages in their 
proper context, it is not clear where Justice Kennedy finds support for 
his assertions. He simply writes them, so they must be true. Such is the 
beauty of attitudinalist jurisprudence. Regardless, what is important is 
simply that his views may be evolving with time. Nobody said that 
being the swing Justice would be easy. 
V. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
This final Part highlights three of the most important lessons of 
the history of the Voting Rights Act at the hands of the Supreme 
Court. The first lesson might be the most important: the Supreme 
Court is an activist institution and the Justices are “single-minded 
seekers of legal policy.”159 In this regard, conservative Justices are no 
different from liberal Justices. More pointedly, it is clear that the 
Justices’ policy preferences provide the best framework for 
understanding the Court’s interpretations of the Act.160 If the past is 
indicative of what is to come, the answer to the constitutional 
question at the heart of section 2 will not be determined by law as 
commonly understood, but rather, the way the Justices have always 
done it: in accordance with the individual policy preferences of the 
Justices in the majority. 
The second lesson follows directly from the first. In the aftermath 
of City of Boerne, scholars took to the law reviews to defend the 
constitutionality of the Act under the newly-minted “congruence and 
proportionality” test.161 They also counseled Congress during the 
extension debates in order to ensure that the next constitutional 
challenge would meet the Court’s exacting standard of review. This is 
a sensible approach and easy to understand. If the legal model is to 
have any traction anywhere, it would be in law schools and law 
reviews. But to make these arguments is to misunderstand how the 
Court will decide the next case. When the Supreme Court takes up 
the constitutionality of the Act, the legal model will play a secondary 
role at best. The Justices might write that the statute is not congruent, 
or disproportional; or maybe Justice Kennedy will decide otherwise. 
The larger point is that the question will not involve a paint-by-
 
 159. George & Epstein, supra note 90, at 325. 
 160. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 699, 703 (2009) (arguing that the Court has interpreted the Voting Rights 
Act strategically in order to reflect the Justices’ policy preferences). 
 161. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997). 
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numbers exercise on the part of the Justices. It will be far from that. 
The third lesson highlights the role of the Supreme Court in 
American politics. For all the “alarums and excursions” that followed 
Professor Bickel’s elegant critique of the Court, 162 it turns out that the 
Justices are far more attuned to public opinion than the 
countermajoritarian argument presumes. This argument opens up two 
final questions. The first ought to be obvious: while the Court often 
sides with the interests of popular majorities, it seldom sides with the 
interests of colored communities. As a consequence, those moments 
when the Justices side with the interests of racial minorities demand 
an explanation. Ths is the best way to understand thee history of the 
Act in Court. Early on, the Act had the full support of the American 
public, as expressed by overwhelming congressional majorities. As the 
goals of the Act evolve away from its original goals, it remains to be 
seen whether the Court will continue to uphold the law as a legitimate 
exercise of congressional power. 
The second question highlights the role of the swing Justice. The 
argument that the Court is in step with public opinion implies that all 
Justices are similarly cognizant and responsive to the public, but this is 
simply not true.163 Public opinion “has direct effects on the attitudes 
and behaviors of individual [J]ustices.”164 But the story is far more 
complex. Michael Link explains: 
[T]he sociopolitical environment in which the Supreme Court 
operates is a dynamic one, one in which mass and elite opinions 
are assumed to play an important, direct role in shaping judicial 
outcomes, if only at the margins. Shifts in the positions of only a 
few justices can have a significant impact in determining the 
outcome of a particular case or more importantly the direction in 
which the Court moves over time in some issue area.165 
To say that the Court is affected by public opinion is only to say 
that some Justices are so affected. Unsurprisingly, researchers also 
find that public opinion has a more pronounced impact on the 
 
 162. Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 54 
(1962). 
 163. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and 
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 196 (1996) 
(concluding that a majority of the Justices analyzed in their study “show no discernible 
responsiveness to the public”). 
 164. Id.; see Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 101. 
 165. Link, supra note 101, at 66. 
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moderate Justices,166 and that public opinion plays a larger role on a 
“reasonably balanced” Court.167 
This is where Justice O’Connor often found herself during the last 
stages of her tenure on the Court, and helps explains her apparent 
change of heart in myriad cases, including most notably her evolution 
from a majority opinion in Croson168 to her majority in the Grutter169 
case. This is also where Justice Kennedy finds himself today. In this 
vein, Adam Cohen wrote four years ago that as Justice Kennedy was 
then taking his place as swing Justice, “there are signs that his views 
are evolving.”170 For support, Cohen offered Kennedy’s reversal of his 
own position on the death penalty for juveniles, as well as his 
increasing advocacy for taking into account international law. Cohen 
attributed this seeming evolution to the fact that Kennedy “cares 
about what people think.”171 Addressing specifically the power and 
influence of the swing Justice, Cohen also wondered “how Justice 
Kennedy will be changed by his vastly expanded influence” and 
whether he would inherit Justice O’Connor’s “mantle of concern.”172 
When we read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Bartlett, we must 
understand it as coming from his position as swing Justice on a 
balanced court. If the Court strikes down the Voting Rights Act, it will 
be through the pen of Justice Kennedy. As his views on this important 
issue continue to evolve, it may be the case that the Act is on safe 
ground after all. 
CONCLUSION 
The future of the majority-minority district is tenuous at best, its 
fate resting in the hands of a conservative majority on the Court. 
When the Court decides to confront the constitutional question, the 
attitudinal preferences of the conservative majority will decide the 
issue. This is another way of saying that the future of the law rests in 
 
 166. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 163, at 197. 
 167. Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 101, at 98. 
 168. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 169. Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 170. Adam Cohen, Anthony Kennedy Is Ready for His Close-Up, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2006, 
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 172. Id. For an example, Cohen offered the following: “It is one thing to argue in dissent 
that campaign finance laws violate the First Amendment. It is quite another to cast the vote that 
prevents a nation weary of lobbying scandals from trying to clean up its elections.” Id. To which 
I can only say, nobody’s perfect. 
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the hands of Justice Kennedy—the Court’s swing vote. The question 
for the future is whether his vision of equality remains grounded in a 
colorblind ideal; or whether, as his more recent opinions suggest, he is 
committed to developing a vision of equality far more 
accommodating of the difficulties inherent in the creation of 
representative institutions.173 
 
 
 173. For a sampling of these difficulties, see Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 323 (1962): 
Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving—
even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a 
representative legislature have been fought out or compromised—considerations of 
geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or 
divergencies among particular local groups, communications, the practical effects of 
political institutions like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of 
settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and senior status, 
mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant data, and a host of others. 
